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In the Supreme Court 
of the 
State of Utah 
FINLEY F. WILKINSON, 
HAROLD N. WILKINSON AND 
H. H. WILKINSON, 
Plaintiffs and Respondents, 
- vs.-
CARLOS 'VOOD, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
Case No. 
8832 
Respondents brought action against Appellant seek-
ing enjoinment of a wall along a right of way, for remov-
al of said wall by Appellant and for damages. The case 
was submitted to the Jury by the Trial Court on Special 
Interrogatories and from the Findings of Fact and Con-
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elusions of Law and Judgment of Trial Court based 
thereon. and by which Judgment Respondents were 
granted the right to remove certain p-ortion of said wall 
and awarded nominal damages Appellant prosecutes 
this Appeal. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On November 30, 1953 by \V arranty Deed bearing 
said date, Respondents obtained from Appellant the fol-
lowing described real property in Davis County, Utah: 
''Beginning at a Point 30 Feet West and 
888.88 Feet South from the Northeast Corner of 
the Northeast Quarter of Section 25, T2N, R1 W, 
Salt Lake Meridian, U. S. Survey and running 
thence West 256.66 Feet; thence North 52 Feet; 
thence East 25.66 Feet; thence South 52 Feet; to 
place of beginning. 
Together with a right of "\Yay over and through 
the following described property: Beginning at a 
p·oint 2.50 chains \Y-est and 888.88 feet South from 
the Northeast Corner of the Northeast Quarter of 
Section 25, T2N, R1 \\7 , Salt Lake ~Ieridian, U. S. 
Survey and running thence South 11 Feet~ thence 
West 160 Feet; thence North 11 Feet thence East 
160 Feet to place of beginning.' 
Such Instrument is Respondents' Exhibit B and note 
should be made that this Appellant and \\-rife executed 
such Instrument on January 6, 1954. The Right of \Y.Ry 
involved in this snit and conYL\yed in connection w"ith 
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.such other land Is 11 Feet in Width and 160 Feet in 
Length. 
Reference is made to Respondents' Exhibit A, a Cer-
tificate of Survey, for more clarification of the exact lo-
cations of the respective properties of the parties hereto 
and said Right of Vv ay. Respondents' Exhibit C, a Dia-
gram or Map, is noted as shovving the Right of vVay in 
Red with the "\\Tall being designated in Blue. The Right 
of vV ay is referred to at times in the testimony as the 
Red Area. Exhibits 4, 5, and 6 of Appellant are Pictures 
of the Right of Way and the Wall. Further referral to 
all of such Exhibits will be made as requisite. 
Arthur B. Maxwell, an Engineer, and vVitness for 
Respondents testified: He made the Certificate of Sur-
vey, Respondents' Exhibit A. (TR. 4) He made a survey 
of the property upon the ground. (TR. 5) The descrip-
tion contained in the Deed was the same as in the Certifi-
cate. (TR. 6) There was a Wall running from the front 
of the vVilkinson Building to a point approximately even 
with the front of the \Vood building. (TR 7) The wall at 
one point \Vas 10.76 feet from the s-outh edge of the right 
of vvay and at another point 10.48 feet from the south 
edge of the described right of way. (TR. 7) At the time of 
survey on December 20, 1955 there was a concrete wall 
erected on the north of the right of way. (TR. 10 and 11). 
Its "\viclth was six inches. ( TR. 11) It was approximate-
ly 22 feet running East and \\Test. ( TR. 11) l-Ie went 
back 1o0 :F.,eet and such 160 Feet would stop at a point 
14 and a half feet to the reRr of the ''Ti]kinson Bnilding. 
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(TR. 13) From his observation it was being used as a 
right of way and he had that morning made such obser-
vation. (TR. 14) The Witness during a recess further 
verified his measurements of the wall and thereupon 
testified that it was an eight inch wall with its total 
width about seven and three-quarters inches with a cap-
stone nine inches wide. (TR. 19) His Certificate showed 
it to he an eight inch wall but such fact would n·ot alter 
the figures he gave as his measurements were made from 
the inside of the wall. (TR. 20). 
Respondent, Finley Wilkinson, testified: That the 
property shown in Yello'\v on the Diagram, Respondents' 
Exhibit C, was the property described in Exhibit B and 
was 256.66 by 52 feet. (TR. 23) At the time -he purchased 
such property he also purchased the right of way back 
to the property described as 256.66 by 52 feet. (TR. 24) 
IIe thought that for about a year they crossed the line 
at any point they desired and then at the end of such 
year three posts about five feet apart in front of the 
building were erected. Even after that they were able to 
go between the posts. (TR. 27). They \Yere able to make 
the same use of the Right of \\---ay as before by crossing 
bet"w'een the steel p-osts. (TR. 28) It was inconYenient to 
enter the Right of\\;'" ay from the 11 foot entrance in that 
they had to go ont on the highway to n1ake sueh entrance. 
(TR. 28) That they had no other right of \vay to get 
from the front property to the storage property that they 
bought. (TR. 29) Occasionally the right of \vay \Yas ob-
strurted hy his usage of it and also by that of 1\ppellaut 
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( TR. 29) His estimate of damage was that it tDok more 
time to take cars from the garage out on the highway and 
then down through the right of way. It probably took 
two to three minutes more. (TR. 31). Average daily 
loss in man hours was two. ( TR. 31) His mechanics 
were paid $2.20 per hour. (TR. 32) Only other inter-
ference with his use of the right of way by the wall being 
there 'vas they had to maintain space open. If the 'vall 
wasn't there they could back cars right out and drive 
them on to the driveway and down the right of way to 
the parking lot. It would give him more use of the 11 
feet. ( TR. 33) The wall was first constructed in Decem-
ber, 1955. (TR. 33) At the tim·e he purchased the 256.66 
by 52 feet, he had no right of way over the property of 
the Appellant. (TR. 35 and 36) The three pipes were 
placed on the north boundary of the right of way in No-
vember, 1954 after he purchased the right of way in Jan-
uary, 1954. (TR. 38) He sa'v a few of his customers 
parked in the right of way. (TR. 40) On many occasions 
Appellant had discussed with him the problem of custo-
mers of the witness coming out of the witness place of 
business and using the right of way to turn around to go 
south and north. (TR. 41) Besides his help and himself 
no one used the right ·of way to go to the back lot of the 
witness. (TR. 41 and 42) The back lot or 256.66 by 52 
feet area was used to keep impounded wrecked cars and 
to park customer's cars. (TR. 42) They came down the 
alley every day. ( TR. 45) Before the wall was erected 
the right of way demarcation was indicated by three steel 
posts. (TR. 47) Because of the inconvenience caused by 
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the wall, he estimated that he lost 2 hours a day in man 
power. (TR. 47 and 48) He made no protest when the 
steel pipes were placed on the line of the right of way 
because his Attorney had advised him not to stir up any 
trouble with his n,eighbor. (TR. 49) 
Appellant, Carlos Wood, testified: That he and ~fr. 
Dunn had sold Respondents the property in Yellow, 
256.66 by 52 feet, behind their present building with said 
right of way. (TR. 58) As to the amount of Right of 
Way, he and Respondent, Harold Wilkinson, measured 
it and came to a conclusion of 160 feet east and west by 
11 feet wide. (TR. 58) The steel posts were put in on 
Thanksgiving Day of 1953 after a survey had been made 
for him so that he \vould be on his property line to put 
the posts in. (TR. 58) In measuring the right of ''ay 
\vidth, they measured from the south side of the steel 
posts to his present building and it was 12 and son1e odd 
feet as sho\vn on the map. (TR. 60) The steel pipes were 
removed to make way for the wall. (TR. 61) The wall 
was not quite finished. (TR. 62) The steel posts were 
put in because the way was being used for parking pur-
poses and people \Vere parking there. It \Yas for the bene-
fit of both that it be used as a driveway. (TR. 62) The 
steel posts were there at the time Respond·ents bought 
the property in January, 1954. (TR. 63) Instead of u~1ng 
the ''Access" or east entrance to the driYeway they 
\vould come fron1 the side and use it side\vays and ron1e 
right in to his traffic and it created a bad situation. 
(TR. 6:1) I-Iis object in building the wall \Vas to make a 
definite rig·ht of \Yny do\Yll through the t\YO hnRinesses 
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and to stop their dumping of their refuse in to the drive-
way. (TR. 64) The wall was built on the same line as the 
steel poles had been on. The north side of the wall was 
on his property line. (TR. 64 and 65). At time of trial 
Respondents were using the right of way for wreckers 
and flat top trucks without any difficulty. (TR. 65 and 
66) The thickness of the wall was eight inches and went 
back about 55 feet. (TR. 68) The Wilkinson Building is 
·encroaching on the right of way in that the footings of the 
buildings are probably 16 inches into the right of way. 
( TR. 68, 69 and 70) The Wall was necessary because it 
made an entrance to a driveway. Before, there was no 
existing driveway. They came in from any angle and it 
blocked him out. Traffic came in on a cross angle. If 
anybody was coming in through there, there was no 
chance of getting away from it. (TR. 81) He and Re-
spondent, Harold vVilkinson, did get together and at one 
time agreed how high he should put the wall. He was 
going out to where the pipe was in the first place but 
Wilkinson talked him in to staying back aways. (TR. 84) 
Witness indicated that the east entrance of the driveway 
should be through the driveway. (TR. 84) It was not in-
tended to be entered by cutting in from the north. They 
blocked him out from using the driveway when they went 
in that way. ( TR. 85) With the wall, the Respondents 
had the same use of the Right of Way as they always had. 
There was an entrance to it. The wall had more or less 
cleaned up between the two buildings. ( TR. 87) He in-
tended to black top the area further and if done it \vou1d 
make the right of way 11.77 Feet \vide up to the enst end. 
( TH. DG) 
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Os-car H. \Vood, a Witness for Appellant, testified: 
l-Ie took out the steel posts in December of 1955. They 
were five and a half inches outside measurement and as 
placed were from 4 1/2 to 5 feet above the ground. (TR. 
100 and 101) They were located on the north line of the 
right of way. (TR. 101) The foundation for the wall was 
placed where the pipes had been. (TR. 103) He made a 
test and there is an abutment or post of the \V"ilkins-on 
I3uilding that sets out in the driveway about 17 inches. 
(TR. 107) Where Respondents are using the Right of 
'Vay on the west end it is about 14 feet wide. That he had 
no difficulty in driving his car down the driveway. The 
\Yall had removed a hazard. (TR. 111 and 112) He bad 
seen oil poured in the right of way by \\~ilkinson em-
ployees. ( TR. 113) After the \Vall \Yas placed, there was 
no more oil in the right of way. (TR. 113) \\~ith the "\\7all 
up the alleyway \Yas straight and you could see from one 
end to the other. (TR. 117). 
Respondents and Appellant rested. (TR. 123) The 
,Jury \vas then taken to Yie\v the premises. (TR. 123) 
Appellant reserves the right to make further state-
ment of any pertinent fact not hereinbefore set forth. 
The C·ourt submitted the cause to the Jury on Special 
Interrogatories. Interrogatory No. 1 being: ·'Do you 
find by the preponderance of the eYidenre that the de-
fendant designated an access on the northeast side- of the 
'red area' and that the plaintiffs aceepted the access, 
11sef1 it, and the defendant then blocked it \Yithout the 
plaintiffs hHving· nhandonrd said access;~" (R 49) The 
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Answer of the Jury thereto was ''Yes". (R 49) Inter-
rogatory No.2 was:'' (Answer only if you have answered 
interrogatory No. 1 'Yes'.) Do you find proven by the 
preponderance of the evidence that the plaintiffs suf-
fered damages as a result of the wrongful blocking of 
the access to the right-of-way by the construction of the 
wall in question~'' The answer of the Jury thereto was 
"No''. (R. 49) 
Appellant promptly filed Motion to Set Aside the 
Verdict of the Jury and to enter Judgment Of No Cause 
Of Action or to grant a New Trial on the grounds that 
such Answers were inconsistent and that the Verdict 
was contrary to the evidence. Motion for New Trial was 
also j·oined therein. (R. 78 and 79) The Trial Court 
denied such Motions. (R. 91). 
· The Trial Court thereupon made and entered Find-
ings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Judgment ap-
proving the Answers ·of the Jury to said Special Inter-
rogatories. (R. 85 to 90 Inclusive) Paragraph 3 of said 
findings of Fact is as follows: "That there would be no 
present and direct benefit to the plaintiffs to remove the 
said wall '\vhere it obstructs the access of the plaintiffs 
and the defendant should not be required to remove the 
wall but the access may be of value in the future, also 
public peace would be promoted by clearly defining 
each's right." (R. 87) By its Judgment the Court ad-
judged that plaintiff has a right of access to said right-
of-way through the area in which Defendant constructed 
the wall for a width of 21 feet commencing at the easterly 
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end of the wall and plaintiff was allowed to remove the 
~rail for said distance of 21 feet. The Plaintiffs were also 
granted nominal damages in the sum of 6 cents. (R. 89 
and 90) 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I. 
THE COURT ERRED IN SUBMITTING SPECIAL IN-
TERROGATORY NO. 1 TO THE JURY. 
POINT II. 
THE COURT ERRED IN ITS FINDINGS OF FACT 
AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND JUDGMENT. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE COURT ERRED IN SUBMITTING SPECIAL IN-
TERROGATORY NO. 1 TO THE JURY. 
For purposes of clarification reference is herewith 
made to Respondents' Exhibit C. San1e sho,vs the Right 
of Way in Red, the Block \r all in Blue Stripes, the Steel 
Posts in Blue and also the Respondents' property for 
which the Right of \\1 ay "\vas purchased in Y ello,v. Same 
also sho,vs the respective Buildings of the parties hereto. 
Said Right of Way runs from the East to the \\---est 160 
Feet and from the Respondents' Property to the South 
11 Feet. Respondents' Property is to the North of the 
Right of \\T ay. Appellant's Property is South of the 
Right of \Vay. The Northeast Side of the ''Red .L~rea ~, 
is Respondents' Property upon 'vhieh n~ sho"\vn by the 
J)iagrain 11H•re is no eonstrnction. 
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Further, Respondents' Exhibit B, now referred to, 
shows that Respondents purchased from Appellant and 
others the Yellow Area at the back of their property 
''Together 'vith a Right of Way over and through the 
following described property.'' Thereafter the ''Red 
Area'' is described more fully. From the Certificate of 
Survey, Respondents' Exhibit A, the ''Red Area'' com-
mences on the property of Appellant. Appellant's Ex-
hibit 4 shows the Wall and the point where the Access in 
question is situated. 
The case eventually turned on not whether Appel-
lant was obstructing the Right of Way as granted by 
him to Respondents but whether or not Respondents 
could enter such Right of Way from any angle they 
wished. 
The Trial Court recognized that the Right of Way 
was founded upon a Deed. That was substantially stated 
by the Court in the Court's Instructions 3 and 4. Bas-
ically, the case involved the interference with a Right 
of Way. This Court has held in Nielsen vs. SGJndberg, 
105 Utah 93, 141 P. 2d. 696, at Page 103 thereof as follows: 
''A right of way founded upon a deed or grant 
is limited to the uses and extent thereof as fixed 
by the grant or deed.'' 
If this is followed then Respondents obtained a Right of 
"\\' ay or the Red Area to go to the Yell ow Area and 
nothing more. llowever, the Trial Court interjected fur-
ther point by giving to the .Tury Instruction No.5 (R. 56) 
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and Appellant Excepted to it. (TR. 125 and 126). Re-
spondent al~so Excepted to certain portions of it. ( TR. 124 
and 125). Reference is made to such Instruction No. 5 .. 
(R. 56) It is quoted as follows: 
''The deed in question is silent as to where 
the plaintiff may enter the right-of-way on to the 
east.. Because the right-of-way runs to a public 
highway, the law concludes the plaintiffs have a 
right to enter or leave at the meeting of the right-
of-way and the public highway. The plaintiff 
would n-ot acquire a right to enter the ''red area'' 
through the northeast side of the ''red area'' by 
any provision of the deed. However, if you find 
all of the following elements proven by the plain-
tiffs by the preponderance of the evidence, then 
you will find that plaintiffs did acquire such an 
access and the defendant wrongfully blocked it. 
The elements are: 
1. That the defendant, ~Ir. Carlos \l'" ood, 
either expressly or impliedly designated 
an access-""'ay along the northeast side of 
the ''red area''. 
2. That the plaintiffs expressly or impliedly 
accepted that designation and used the 
access. 
3. That the plaintiffs did not either express-
ly or impliedly surrender said access, if 
any, on the northeast side of the ''red 
area'' before the 'vall ''"'as built. 
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If you find each of these elements so pro;ven, you 
'vill ansvver interrogatory number one "yes" and 
proceed to the next interrogatory. If you answer 
''no'' you have disposed of the case and need not 
consider the other interrogatories.'' 
D:awn to the word "However", Appellants have no 
quarrel vvith such Instruction. From such word on the 
Instruction had no basis in fact nor law for being given. 
The evidence of Respondents was that the Steel Posts 
consisting of Three were erected. ( TR. 27) Respondents 
stated date of erection thereof as November, 1954. (TR. 
38) Appellant stated they were erected on Thanksgiving 
Day of 1953 (TR. 58) after a survey so they would be on 
his property line. (TR. 58) Appellant and Respondent, 
Harold Vlilkinson, did get together and agreed on hovv 
high the 'vall should be at one time. ( TR. 84) This fact 
\vas not disputed by Respondents. The 'vall was built on 
the same line as the steel poles had been on. ( TR. 64 and 
65) Also, in measuring the right of vvay width, they 
measured from the south side of the steel posts. Appel-
lant's Exhibit 1 is a picture of the sturdy steel posts so 
removed. Respondents admitted they had no rig·ht of 
'vay over Appellant's property before they purrhased the 
right of way. (TR. 35 and 36) Before the wall was erect-
ed the right of way demarcation was indicated by three 
steel posts. (TR. 47) Respondents made no protests when 
the steel pipes were placed on the right of way. (TR. 49) 
Under snch fact.s pre~ented to the Court., Appellant con-
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tends that the Instruction e;omplained of was not perti-
nent to this case. The Trial Court semed concerned about 
an easement of access which was not a part of this case. 
The ·easement was the right of way founded upon the 
deed. 
The Trial Court while instructing the Jury as afore-
said did not enlighten the Jury on the meaning of the 
word '' Acceg.s' '. Appellant testified that Respondents 
instead of using the ''Access'' or east entrance to the 
driveway would come from the side and use it sideways 
and come right in to his traffic and it created a bad situ-
ation. (TR. 63) Appellant surely was certain of such 
meaning. In Dexter & N. R. Co. vs. Foster, et al, 119 N.Y. 
S. 731, 64 Misc. Rep. 500, the Court at page 733 says: 
''The word 'access' is defined as a way of 
approach or entrance, passage, path, means of 
approach, way of entrance, or passage to any-
thing.'' 
The Trial Court determined that the Jury decide the 
case on access without defining it for the Jury. It ,yas 
not too much of in1port that the easement or right of "\Vay 
was founded on a deed. The Trial Court in said Instruc-
tion No. 5 (R. 56) inforn1ed the Jury that the deed "Tas 
silent as to where the plaintiff could enter the right of 
\Vay. No Deed usually contains or sets forth such port 
of entry. The right of 'vny is rlefined by the Deed and 
that is its extent. 
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The Trial Court overlooked the fact that the particu-
lar access involved was not one from a highway but ac-
tually from the property of Respondents. Construction of 
the Deed, Respondent's Exhibit B, cannot make ap-
purtenant the property of Respondents other than the 
Yellow Area to the Right of Way. In 17 Am. Jur. Sec. 
119, Page 728 the following is stated: 
''A grant or reservation of a right to pass 
upon a private way to one lot does not confer the 
right to pass further upon the same way to 
another lot. Similarly, a right of way appurtenant 
to a particular tract cannot be used as a mode of 
access to another lot to vvhich it is not appurtenant 
even though there is no resulting burden.'' 
By his acts in placing steel posts on the boundary 
line of the right of way, Appellant cannot be accused of 
designating any access way to Respondents. Further, 
the steel posts were removed and the wall complained of 
was placed as the line of demarcation. Appellant had 
absolute right to fence the right of way. In Willing vs. 
Booker, 168 S. E. 417, lnO Va. 461, at Page 419 thereof 
the Court says: 
"Ownership of land carried with it the right 
to a division fence on common boundaries of ad-
joining lands. The right and the burden of owners 
of adjoining land are common and legal. That dif-
ferent estates or interests may exist in one parcel 
of surh lands does not destroy or affect the com-
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mon right and burden. Each estat·e and interest in 
each parcel of the land may enjoy the right, and 
from it's inception is subject to the possible bur-
den of the exercise of the right unless it has been 
freed expressly or impliedly by the parties (or 
their predeces~s.ors in the title) who own each of 
the adjoining parcels of land and those creating 
the estate or interest.'' 
Absolute disregard of the inherent right of Appellant 
to fence the right of way was made. The Trial Court in 
submitting such Interrogatory neglected this fundamen-
tal factor in the case. In 28 C. J. S. Sec. 98 (a), Page 7b0 
it is stated: 
''The owner of the servient estate may erect 
fences along the sides of a way, but not across or 
within the way so as to obstruct it entirely." 
The Trial Court failed to consider at all times the 
right of Appellant to fence the way and his right to 1·ely 
on the construction of the Deed as to the extent of the 
easement granted Respondents. 
In Dyba vs. Borowitz, 136 Pa. Super. 532, 7 A. 2d. 
500 the real crux of the issue in this case was met head 
on. The Court at page 501 thereof says : 
''The oft repeated rule is that the 'vords in a 
grant are to be construed in their ordinarv and 
. 
natural sense, and that they are to be given a 
reasonable ronRtruction in accord \Yith the inten-
tion of the parties. * * * ,, ... e find no words in this 
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grant that expressly or impliedly forbid the erec-
tion of boundary fence, nor does the proof estab-
lish any circumstances that deprives defendant of 
that right. There was no proof or finding of fact 
by the chancellor of any interference with the 
right of ingre·ss, egress and regress 'through and 
over' the alley. Concedely, no gates, barrier or 
obstruction of any kind was erected therein that 
would deprive plaintiff of the use of it. They have 
access to either terminus as they did prior to the 
erection of . the fence. We think the language of 
the grant does not justify the conclusion that the 
plaintiffs have the privilege to enter or cross the 
alley at any point. ' ' 
In the case at bar, no interference with Respondents' 
right of ingress, egress and regress through and over 
the right of way was proven. They still used it the 
same as before. They still had access to either terminus 
as before. Truly, the language of the Deed, Respond-
ents' Exhibit B, did not grant to them the right to enter 
or cross the right of way at any point they desired . .Ap-
pellant did not substantially interfere 'Nith the easement 
he granted l{espondents. Quoting further from the case 
of Dyba vs. Borowitz, supra, the Court at Page 502 there-
of says: 
''In Af ercantile Library Co. vs. Fidelity Trust 
Co., supra, (235 Pa. Page 15, 83 A. Page 595) the 
Court said 'The ·o-vvner of the servient soil has the 
right to make use of his property as he chooses, 
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if by ·SO doing he does not substantially interfere 
with the easement'. Other cases sustaining this 
principle are Connery vs. Brooke, supra, Hart-
man vs. Frick, 167 Pa. 18, 31 A. 342, 46 Am. St. 
Rep. 658, Graham vs. Water Pow·er Corp., supra, 
Kohler vs. Smith, 3 Pa. Super. 176, Helw·ig vs. 
Miller, 47 Pa. Super. 171; Ziegler vs. Hoffman, 
78 Pa. Super. 115. 
While we have found no case and none has 
been cited expressly deciding th·e question before 
us, the right to build a fence along a right of way 
is generally recognized in other jurisdictions. See 
Guse vs. Flohr, et al. 195 Wis. 139, 217 N. W. 730, 
Good vs. Petticrew, et al., 165 Va. 526, 183 S. E. 
217; Willing vs. Booker, 160 Va. 461, 168 S. E. 4i7. 
'Unquestionable the owner of a servient tenement 
may f.ence along the way or not, as his con;ven-
ience may dictate' 9 R. C. L. p. 801, Sec. 56. 'The 
owner .of a servient estate may erect fenees along 
the sides of a way, but not across the \Yay as to 
obstruct it' 19 C. J. p. 986, Sec. 240. 
It is true that there was no fence \Yhen this 
easement was created and none was erected for a 
period of almost eig-hteen ~Tears thereafter, and 
those facts are 'vorthv- of eonsideration. But theY 
... . 
are not sufficient to depriYe the servient O"\vner 
·of his inherent right to use his property as he sees 
fit, including the erertion of a div-ision fenre "\Yith 
suitable access to the easement. It n1ust be horne 
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in mind that all that was granted was a right of 
way 'through and over two and ninety six hun-
dredths (2 16/.00) feet wide.' The fundamental 
right to erect a fence upon the boundary line can-
not be taken away from the owner of the fee by 
that language. '' 
Appellant did not intend that such easement be so 
used by Respondents with the resultant burden to him. 
Construing, as we must, the Deed, he assumed that the 
Right of Way was to be over the 11 feet only and care-
fully preserved open either and both terminus thereof. 
This C·ourt in Wade vs. Domais, 52 Utah 310, 173 P. 564, 
at Page 316 thereof quotes with appro.val as follows: 
''In Norris vs. Blant, 49 Utah at Page 243, 
161 Pac. at Page 1133, this Court says: 'In con-
struing any grant of right of way the use, in 
character and extent, is limited to such as is rea-
sonably nece.ssary and convenient to the do1ninant 
estate and as little burdensome to the servient 
estate as possible for the use contemplated.' . " 
Appellant asserts that the use demanded by Respondents 
placed a burden on the servient estate not contemplated 
by the Deed. In Houghtalling vs. Stoothoff, 19 N. Y. S. 
2d. 510, the Court at Page 511 says: 
"Plaintiff is entitled to nothing more than an 
nnoh~tructed right of passage. Pro.vided only that 
the right of passage is not obstructed, the o"\vners 
. of the servient tenement are entitlPd to fence their 
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land. Bail vs. Bail, 108 N. Y. 511, 15 N. E. 538. '' 
Appellant clearly reeognized the right of Respondents 
and provided such unobstructed passage to which they 
are entitled. The Deed cannot possibly be construed 
to grant Respondents port of entry as interpreted by 
the Trial Court. If this be so, then all Deeds granting 
Easements had best specify such port -of entry or nega-
tive such entry at all angles chooseable to the holder of 
the same. 
Under the facts and the law it was truly error on 
the part of the Trial Court to submit the cause to the 
Jury on solely Interrogatory No.1. Even so, the Answer 
of Yes thereto of the Jury is contrary to the evidence. 
The Jury completely ignored the fact that ther-e had 
been steel posts on the property line and that .Appellant 
and Respondent, Harold Wilkinson, did get together 
and at one time agreed how high the wall should be 
placed. (TR. 84) This testimony of Appellant was 
never controverted and could not support a finding that 
Appellant designated an access-w·ay. Respondents ''ere 
fully aware that they 'Yere not to use the X ortheast 
Side of the ''Red Area'' to enter upon said 11 Feet. 
Under the e:vidence before it the Jury in making sucb 
Answer rendered a \T erdict absolutely contrary to the 
evidence and not supported by ~uch eYidence. How-
ever, considering the Ans,ver of No of the Jury to In-
terrogatory No. 2 ":ith its 1-r es Ans"'"er to X o. 1, there 
is no doubt thnt the .J nry ''a~ r.otnplcte1y confused by 
the erroneous Ins trncti on No. ;) of the Court and also 
thP PJToneous IntPrrog·atory X o. 1. 
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POINT II. 
THE COURT ERRED IN ITS FINDINGS OF FACT 
AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND JUDGMENT. 
Up·on rendition of such Answ·ers by the Jury, Ap-
pellant promptly filed Motion and Motion For New 
Trial (R. 78 and 78A) pointing out to the Trial Court 
the error and inconsistency of the Answers of the Jury 
and requesting entry of Judgment Of No Cause of Action 
or that a New Trial be granted. Appellant submitted 
to the Trial Court a Memorandum Of Authorities. (R. 
79 to 84 Inclusive). Reference thereto is herewith made. 
Thereafter the Trial Court apparently adopted and 
approved the Answers of the Jury and made and entered 
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Judgment 
based thereon. (R. 85 to 90 inclusive). While stating 
that such Answers were adopted and approved, the 
Trial Court, despite the Answer of No of the Jury to 
Interrogatory No. 2 by which the Jury found that Re-
·spondents suffered no damage, proceeded to award to 
Respondents against Appellant nominal damages of 6 
cents. This was error as a verdict for no damages can 
never be construed as one for no1ninal damages. The 
rule is well stated in 25 C .• J. S. Section 189 (A) as 
follows: 
''A verdict for 'no damages' rannot be con-
strued as one for nominal damages.'' 
Also in }/[ endenhall vs. Struck, 207 Iowa 1094, 224 N. ,V. 
95, the Court at Page 1100 thereof states: 
''A 'no damage' verdict cannot be viewed as 
a verdict for nominal damages.'' 
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Having by Paragraph 1 of the Findings of Fact (R. 86) 
approved the Answers of the Jury, the Trial Court 
then proceeded to enter Judgment absolutely contrary 
thereto. 
There is additional Finding of Fact of the Trial 
Court which does not support the Judgment as rendered 
by the Trial Court. Note is made of Paragraph 3 of 
the Findings of Fact of the Court. (R. 87) Quotation 
thereof is made: ''That there "\vould be no present and 
direct benefit to the Plaintiff to remove the said wall 
where it obstructs the access of the plaintiff and the 
defendant should not be required to remove the wall 
but the access may be of value in the future, also public 
peace would be promoted by clearly defining each's 
right.'' The Trial Court, apparently viewed the Answers 
and V·erdict of the Jury as being for the Appellant, but 
then proceeded to enter J udgn1ent against Appellant 
that Respondents could ren1ove the \\ ... all for 21 Feet. 
Respondents in this action sought injunctive relief. They 
were not entitled to the s.ame. Respondents indicate by 
their Statement of Points of Respondents on Appeal 
(R. 97) that they will contend that the entire \Yall should 
be removed. Detern1ina tion of 21 Feet of removal of 
the "\Vall is not satisfactory to them. It is somewhat 
conjecture as to how such 21 Feet \Yas arri,Ted at by 
the Trial Court. Referring to Respondents' Exhibit C, 
the Diagran1, the Easen1ent \Yith the ,, ... all \Yas sub-
stantially the 11 Feet \Yidth as called for by the Deed. 
Despit0 the usP of the \Yord "\\Tongful" in Interrogatory 
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No. 2, (R. 49) the Jury found no damages resulted to 
Respondents. The Answer of the Jury -could not have 
been other\vise under the evidence submitted by Re-
spondents on the question of their damages. Thusly, 
the Trial Court found that there would be no pres-ent 
and direct benefit to Respondents to remove the wall. 
The ·evidence showed no substantial interference with 
the Easement of 11 Feet and the Jury found Respond-
ents suffered no damage. Respondents should there-
upon have been denied the relief they sought. It was 
error for the Trial Court to do otherwise. In Clough 
vs. W. H. Healy Co. 53 Cal. App. 397, 200 P. 378, the 
Court at Page 379 thereof says: 
"To entitle complainant to equitable relief 
the right must be clear and an injunction of the 
character herein in question will be denied when 
the obstruction does not constitute a material in-
terference with the right of the owner of the ease-
ment, or where the damage sustained by him is 
merely nominal. * * * In the case at bar there was 
no wilfull or deliberate invasion ~f the plaintiff's 
right of way, nor was there any breach of the 
agreement respecting it after its change of loca-
tion. The plaintiff has suffered no damage.'' 
Respondents, upon the evidence adduced by them 
showed no right to the relief demanded by them and no 
right to the removal of the wall or any portion thereof. 
Their principal and only complaints against the vvall 
were that it took them two to three minutes more to 
move automobiles; (TR. 31) that they estimate snffer-
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ance of daily loss of two man hours; (TR. 31) and that 
they would have more use of the 11 feet. (TR. 33) Ap-
pellant stated that it was for the benefit of both that it 
be used as a driveway. (TR. 62) Instead of using the 
''Access'' or east entrance to the driveway they would 
come from the side and right in to his traffic. (TR. 63) 
Ap.pellant's object in building the \vall was to make a 
definite right of way down through the two businesses 
and I to stop their dumping of their refuse in to· the 
driveway. (TR. 64) Appellant showed use by Respond-
ents of the easement beyond its original purpose. Re-
spondents \vere casting a greater burden on it than 
permissible. In 17 Cal. J ur. 2d. Section 27, at Page 131, 
it is stated: 
''The owner of an easement has no right to 
commit a trespass on the serYient tenement. He 
must use the easement in such a manner as to im-
pose as slight a burden upon the servient estate 
as practicable.'' 
The Trial Court by it Finding of Fact, Paragraph 
3 and heretofore quoted, chose to delve in to the future, 
while finding that presently there 'Yas no benefit to 
Respondents by removal of the 'vall. The obstruction 
was required to be a n1aterial interference 'Yith Re-
spondents' use of the right of \vay before the Trial 
Court could act. The present was involved not the 
future. In 17 Cal. ,Jur. :?d. Sec. 50 at Pagc~s 163 and 
164 it is stated: 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
25 
"But an injunction \Vill be denied where the 
obstruction sought to be removed does not consti-
tute a material interference with the right of the 
owner of the easement, or where the damages sus-
tained by him is merely nominal. vVhere removal 
of the obstruction would bring no actual advantage 
or the expenses entailed thereby would be entirely 
disproportionate to the benefit resulting, the oom-
plainan t will be relegated to his legal remedy for 
the vindication of his right.'' 
The interest of the Trial Court as stated in said 
Paragraph 3 of the Findings, heretofore quoted, re-
garding promotion of the public peace was adequately 
provided for by Paragraph 5 of the Findings (R. 87) 
whereby the parties stipulated in Open Court that a 
permanent injunction issue against both parties from 
blocking the right of way. The Judgment in Paragraph 
3 thereof, (R. 90) permanently enjoins both parties 
from blocking or obstructing the right of way. Such en-
j·oinment of both parties should have disposed of the 
case but the Trial Court deemed it requisite to allow 
removal of 21 Feet of the Wall by Respondents. Ap-
pellant was entitled to maintain the Wall or he was not en-
titled to do so. The Judgment of the Trial Court is 
erroneous in granting such removal of the portion of 
the Wall and in awarding Respondents non1inal dam-
ag-es from Appellant. 
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CONCLUSION 
By reason of the palpable errors of the Trial Court 
in this cause, the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law 
and Judgment should be by this Court set aside and 
reversed and the cause Remanded back to the Trial 
Court with directions to enter Judgment Of No Cause 
Of Action in favor of Appellant and against Respond-
ents but with the Trial Court to enjoin both parties 
in such Judgment from blocking or obstructing the right 
of way. 
Respectfully Submitted, 
BARCLAY AND BARCLAY 
Attorneys For Defendant and 
Appellant 
109-110-111 Atlas Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
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